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The Supreme Court's
Jurisdiction-Reform Proposals,
Discretionary Review, and Writ

Dismissals
James F. Blumstein*
Judicial reform is in the air. Almost fifty years have elapsed
since the statutory basis for Supreme Court jurisdiction' has been
altered substantially, 2 but court reform seems to be a current topic
of conversation at bar association meetings, 3 in popular journals of
opinion,4 on public television,5 and, to some extent, even in the
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.A. 1966, M.A. 1970, LL.B. 1970,
Yale University.
Research for this project received support from the Vanderbilt University Research
Council to which the author expresses his appreciation. Lewis Beckwith, Dean Rivkin, and
David Pollard, all former students at Vanderbilt Law School, performed the thankless task
of finding cases in which certiorari had been dismissed, and the author gratefully acknowledges their enormous contribution. Finally, the author thanks Mr. Robert Bastress, a student
at Vanderbilt Law School, for his background memorandum on the abstention doctrine, and
Mr. C. Edward Dobbs, an associate editor of the Law Review, for the work he has done in
assiduously tracking down sometimes obscure footnote references.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 provides, inter alia, that "the supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make." (emphasis added). See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). See generally Ratner, CongressionalPower Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 157 (1960); Tweed, Provisions of the
Constitution Concerning the Supreme Court of the United States, 31 B.U.L. REv. 1 (1951).
2. See note 19 infra and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, American Bar Association
Annual Meeting, August 1972, in 58 A.B.A.J. 1049 (1972); Address by Chief Justice Warren
E. Burger, American Bar Association Annual Meeting, July 5, 1971, in 57 A.B.A.J. 855 (1971).
4. See, e.g., Bickel, The Overworked Court: A Reply to Arthur J. Goldberg, THE NEW
REPUaLIc, Feb. 17, 1973, at 17-18; Goldberg, One Supreme Court:It Doesn't Need Its Cases
Screened, THE NEW REPuBLIC, Feb. 10, 1973, at 14-16; 74 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan.
1, 1973, at 29; N.Y. Times, May 16, 1973, at 23, col. 1; N.Y. Times, May 7, 1973, at 29, col.
2; N.Y. Times, May 2, 1973, at 50, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1973, at 13, col. 3; Wall Street
Journal, Jan. 2, 1973, at 20, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1972, at 1, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Nov.
14, 1972, at 27, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1972, at 36, col. 1.
5. The public broadcasting network program "The Advocates" devoted a session to
judicial reform in early 1973.
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scholarly reviews.'
Since the enactment of the Judges' Bill in 1925, 7 many specific
aspects of Supreme Court practice have come under close scrutiny.
For example, Professor Fowler Harper and his associates investigated the Supreme Court's certiorari practices in a series of articles
in the early 1950's;" Professor Albert Sacks' criticized the Court's
summary per curiam opinion practice in the wake of the Segregation
Cases;"' and Professor Ernest Brown questioned the validity of the
practice whereby the Court granted certiorari and simultaneously
reversed the decision of a federal court of appeals or state supreme
court without briefs or oral argument." This paper will discuss first
some of the issues involved in reforming Supreme Court jurisdiction
and then examine the Court's practice of dismissing certiorari as
improvidently granted after briefs and oral argument.
ProposedJudicial Reform
Since the appointment of Warren Burger as Chief Justice of the
United States in 1969, the mechanics of judicial administration
have received increased attention. Chief Justice Burger has instituted an annual State of the Judiciary message' 2 and generally has
6. See, e.g., Brennan, The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L.
REv. 473 (1973); Poe, Schmidt, & Whalen, A National Court of Appeals: A Dissenting View,
67 Nw. U.L. REv. 842 (1973); Note, Summary Disposition of Supreme Court Appeals: The
Significance of Limited Discretion and a Theory of Precedent, 52 B.U.L. Rav. 373 (1972);
Note, National Court of Appeals: Composition, Constitutionality, and Desirability, 41
FORDHAM L. REv. 863 (1973).
7. Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936, as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1256-57
(1970).
8. See Harper & Leibowitz, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do During the 1952
Term, 102 U. PA. L. Rav. 427 (1954); Harper & Pratt, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do
During the 1951 Term, 101 U. PA. L. Rav. 439 (1953); Harper & Etherington, What the
Supreme Court Did Not Do During the 1950 Term, 100 U. PA. L. Ray. 354 (1951); Harper &
Rosenthal, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do in the 1949 Term-An Appraisal of
Certiorari,99 U. PA. L. REv. 293 (1950).
9. See Sacks, The Supreme Court, 1953 Term-Foreword,68 HARV. L. REv. 96, 99-103
(1954).
10. The Segregation Cases include: Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). See
Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (Court refers to the "Segregation Cases").
11. See Brown, The Supreme Court, 1957 Term-Foreword:Process of Law, 72 HAM.
L. Rav. 77 (1958). See also Note, The DiscretionaryPower of the Supreme Court to Dismiss
Appeals from State Courts, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 688 (1963).
12. See note 3 supra.
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taken a leadership role in promoting legislative efforts at judicial
reform. In addition, the Federal Judicial Center, established in
1968,13 has prospered under the new Chief Justice, and its resources
and responsibilities have expanded considerably over the past three
or four years.' 4 Charged with the duty of examining the operation
of the federal courts, '5 the Judicial Center in 1971 assembled a group
to study the case load of the Supreme Court. In December 1972 the
Freund Committee" released its report, which recommended the
establishment by Congress of a National Court of Appeals to ease
the workload of the Supreme Court. 17 By reviewing cases from lower
federal courts and passing along to the Supreme Court only a relatively small number from which the high court would select cases
for actual hearing, 8 the new court would take over much of the
screening now done by the Supreme Court.
In his preface to the Study Group's Report, Alfred P. Murrah,
Director of the Federal Judicial Center and Senior United States
Circuit Judge, noted that since the 1925 Congressional expansion of
the Supreme Court's discretionary control over its docket, there has
not been a significant alteration in the basis of the Court's jurisdic13. "There is established within the judicial branch of the Government a Federal Judicial Center, whose purpose it shall be to further the development and adoption of improved
judicial administration in the courts of the United States." Act of Dec. 20, 1967, 28 U.S.C.
§ 620(a) (1970); see Clark, Reflection on the PresentFooting of JudicialAdministration, 60
Ky. L.J. 828, 832-33 (1972). See also Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, American
Bar Association Annual Meeting, August 1972, in 58 A.B.A.J. 1049, 1053 & n.5 (1972).
14. For a discussion of some of the programs and accomplishments of the Federal
Judicial Center see Clark, The FederalJudicialCenter, 26 Mo. B.J. 570 (1970).
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 620(b)(1) (1970).
16. The study group is named after its Chairman, Professor Paul Freund of Harvard
Law School. In addition to Professor Freund, the members of the Study Group included
Professors Alexander M. Bickel and Charles A. Wright, Dean Russell D. Niles and Messrs.
Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Bernard G. Segal, and Robert L. Stern.
17.

REPORT OF THE STUDY

GROUP ON THE CASE LOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT, at 18, 47-48

(Fed. Judicial Center ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as REPORT]. The proposed tribunal would
be composed of 7 federal circuit judges assigned for 3-year staggered terms by a system of
automatic rotation. Id. at 19.
18. Id. The Committee recommended that "all cases now within the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction, excepting only original cases, be filed initially in the National Court of Appeals,
preferably on certiorari, but in any event on papers having the same form and content they
would have if they continued to be filed in the Supreme Court directly." Id. at 20. While
under the Committee proposal denial of review by the National Court of Appeals would be
final, the new court could, with the concurrence of a sufficient number of judges, certify cases
to the Supreme Court for additional screening and possible adjudication there. Id. at 21. For
an earlier proposal that a new court be established with final screening authority in nonconstitutional matters see Strong, The Time Has Come to Talk of Major Curtailment in the
Supreme Court's Jurisdiction,48 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1969).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

tion.' 9 Restructuring the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court was initiated in the 1920's under the banner of judicial reform
by another reform-minded Chief Justice, William Howard Taft."
The culmination of Taft's efforts to reshape the appellate docket of
the Supreme Court was the Judges' Bill of 1925, which curtailed the
Court's obligatory jurisdiction and invested it with more discretion
in handling its docket. 2' Although the story of the development of
2
the federal judiciary has been told too well to warrant repetition, 2
a brief recounting of the events leading to the enactment of the
Judges' Bill is in order.
William Howard Taft, a longtime advocate of limiting the Supreme Court's workload, evidently considered it his duty as Chief
Justice to take the lead in promoting change. 23 With his encouragement, a committee of Supreme Court justices24 drafted a bill designed to reduce the number and kinds of cases that the Court was
obligated to review. At the urging of the Chief Justice and the Justices on the drafting committee, and apparently out of deference to
the members of the Court, Congress enacted the proposed statute
25
with only minor revisions.
The 1925 Act seems to have been promoted as a means of enabling the Court to keep abreast of its current business. 26 At that time
the Court was about two years behind in its docket, 27 and there was
19. REPORT, supra note 17, at v.
20. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 228, 255-86
(1928). See also Taft, The Attacks on the Courts and Legal Procedure, 5 KY. L.J. No. 2, 3
(1916).
21. See generally Taft, The Jurisdictionof the Supreme Court Under the Act of February 13, 1925, 35 YALE L.J. 1, 2-10 (1925).
22. See, e.g., F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 20; H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953); Note, The Discretionary Power of the
Supreme Court to Dismiss Appeals from State Courts, 63 COLUM L. REv. 688, 701-03 (1963).
See also Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 448 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
23. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, saljra note 20, at 259; see Burton, "Judging Is Also
Administration":An Appreciation of ConstructiveLeadership, 33 A.B.A.J. 1099, 1165 (1947).
24. The committee was composed of Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Day,
who was succeeded on his retirement from the bench by Mr. Justice Sutherland. See F.
FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 20, at 260.
25. Id. at 273-80.
26. See Frankfurter & Landis, The Supreme Court Under the JudiciaryAct of 1925, 42
HARv. L. REv. 1 (1928). For a description of the Court's case load and work immediately prior
to the enactment of the Judges' Bill see Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme
Court of the United States-A Study in the Federal JudicialSystem, 40 HARv. L. REv. 431,
834 & 1110 (1926, 1927); Shelton, The Danger of the Increased Burden Upon the Federal
Supreme Court from Its Continually Expanding Docket, 92 CENT. L.J. 279, 280 (1921).
27. See Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court of the United
States-A Study in the Federal Judicial System, 40 HARv. L. REv. 834, 836 & n.7 (1927).
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an understandable feeling that this delay was intolerable. In the
House hearings on the proposed legislation, Chief Justice Taft
stated that "[iut is primarily a bill to bring within the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court all the business of the country in such a way
that it can keep up with its docket. '28 In an analysis of the bill
prepared by the Justices for Congress, two major needs were identified-limiting the Court's docket and codifying the various jurisdic2
tional statutes governing Supreme Court review. 1
The Freund Committee recommendations respond'to similar
concerns of docket overcrowding. As the Report states on the first
page, "[tjhe indispensable condition" for the maintenance of quality work by the high court is "adequate time and ease of mind for
research, reflection, and consultation in reaching a judgment
... "I From the figures that show an increased number of cases
filed with the Court, 3' the Committee concluded that the case load
of the Court barred adequate time for carrying out its responsibili2
ties.1
These conclusions about the oppressiveness of the case load
mirror those of some current members of the Court. The Chief Justice, for example, consistently has maintained that "something
must be done to arrest the constant increase in docketed cases in
the Supreme Court or the quality of the Supreme Court's work
would become impaired, and the Court would be unable to perform
its historic role in the American system of government. '33 Another
Court member, Justice Rehnquist, also has cited the difficulties
28. Hearings on H.R. 8206 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 2d
Sess. 25-29 (1924) [hereinafter cited as 1924 House Hearings].
29. "The primary object of the bill is to relieve the congestion resulting from the present
overcrowded docket of the Supreme Court .... " Hearings on S. 2060 & 2061 Before a
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1924)
[hereinafter cited as 1924 Senate Hearings]. "The bill has the further purpose of revising
and restating in one enactment the complete appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
.Id. at 21.
30. REPORT, supra note 17, at 1.
31. Id. at 2-9. For a discussion of the burgeoning number of cases filed for review in the
federal courts of appeals see Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Court of Appeals: The
Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HAiv. L. Rzv. 542 (1969).
32. "The statistics of the Court's current workload, both in absolute terms and in the
mounting trend, are impressive evidence that the conditions essential for the performance of
the Court's mission do not exist . ... [T]he pressures of the docket are incompatible with
the appropriate fulfillment of its historic and essential functions." REPORT, supra note 17, at
5.
33. Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, American Bar Association Annual
Meeting, August 1972, in 58 A.B.A.J. 1049, 1053 (1972).
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imposed on the Justices by the large volume of cases they must
34
screen .
Critics of the Freund Committee Report note, however, that
petition-screening is not as time-consuming as the raw numbers of
3
petitions filed might indicate5.
They argue that since at least one
Justice must express a desire to talk about a case, the vast majority
of petitions never come up for discussion at conference. A better
measure of overwork, they contend, is whether the Court is current
with its docket 3 7-as it was not prior to the enactment of the Judges'
Bill in 1925. Justice Douglas has been outspoken in his belief that
the Supreme Court is not overworked, 38 and Justice Stewart also has
stated that the case load is "neither intolerable nor impossible to
handle. 3 9 Moreover, former Chief Justice Warren" and Justice
Brennan 4' both agree that the burden of screening is manageable.
In any case, discussion of the merits of any judicial reform
proposal should not be confined to a debate over whether the Supreme Court is "overworked," however that subjective concept is
defined. Overwork, as Nathan Lewin has put it, "is about as measurable as a migraine headache-and like a headache its cause and
cure depend on highly personal factors."42 Like many measures that
34. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: Past and Present, 59 A.B.A.J. 361 (1973). In addition, Justice Stewart was quoted as saying after a single term of service on the court that the
increased case load "means, I am sorry to say, that there simply is not so much time as ideally
there should be for the reflective deliberation so essential to the judicial process." See
Griswold, The Supreme Court, 1959 Term, Foreword:Of Time and Attitudes-ProfessorHart
and Judge Arnold, 74 HAav. L. REV. 81, 84 (1960).
35. See, e.g., Address by Justice Brennan to the First Circuit Judicial Conference, in
59 A.B.A.J. 835 (1973); Goldberg, supra note 4, at 15; Gressman, Much Ado About Certiorari,
52 GEO. L.J. 742, 744 (1964); Poe, Schmidt & Whalen, supra note 6, at 846-48; Address by
Retired Chief Justice Warren at the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, May 1,
1973, in 59 A.B.A.J. 724, 726-27 (1973).
36. See Brennan Address, supra note 35, at 837-38. Justice Harlan once observed that
"[o]f the total petitions acted on I think it must be said that more than one-half were so
untenable that they never should have been filed." Harlan, Manning the Dikes, 13 RECORD
OF N.Y.C.B.A. 541, 547 (1958); accord, Magnum Import Co. v. Coty, 262 U.S. 159, 163 (1923)
(Taft, C.J.); S. REP. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1937) (letter from Chief Justice Hughes
to Senator Wheeler).
37. See Gressman, supra note 35, at 747; Warren Address, supra note 35, at 727; Westen, Threat to the Supreme Court, N.Y. REV. OF BooKs, Feb. 22, 1973, at 29-30.
38. See, e.g., Douglas, Managing the Docket of the Supreme Court of the United States,
25 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 279, 297-98 (1970); Douglas, The Supreme Courtand Its Case Load,
45 CORNELL L.Q. 401, 402 (1960). See also Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151,
174 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
39. 55 HARv. L. RECORD No. 8, at 1 (1972).
40. See Warren Address, supra note 35, at 726-27.
41. See Brennan, supra note 6, at 476-77; Brennan Address, supra note 35, at 836.
42. Lewin, Helping the Court With Its Work: A Response to Goldberg and Bickel, THE
NEW REPUBLC, Mar. 3, 1973, at 15.
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proceed under the nonpartisan label of administrative reform, important policy objectives underlie one's evaluation of any alteration
in existing jurisdictional practice. Frankfurter and Landis make this
point at the beginning of their work on the federal system:
The mechanism of law ...

cannot be disassociated from the ends that law

subserves. So-called jurisdictional questions treated in isolation from the purposes of the legal system to which they relate become barren pedantry. After
all, procedure is instrumental; it is the means of effectuating policy. Particularly true is this of the federal courts. The Judiciary Acts . . . are the outcome

of continuous interaction of traditional political, social, and economic forces
:

. .

. [T]he legislation governing the structure and function of the federal

judicial system is one means of providing
the accommodations necessary to the
3
operation of the federal government.

The recognition of this fact in the current debate is a mark of the
increased sophistication that has attended public policy dialogue
over the last decade or so.
InstitutionalRole of the Supreme Court
To its credit, the Freund Committee acknowledges at the outset
the basic policy judgment underlying its recommendations. This
perspective is critical in understanding the committee's proposals
and in analyzing the criticisms of its suggested institutional
changes:
Any assessment of the Court's workload will be affected by the conception
that is held of the Court's function in our judicial system and in our national
life. We accept and underscore the traditional view that the Supreme Court is
not simply another court of errors and appeals. Its role is a distinctive and
essential one in our legal and constitutional order: to define and vindicate the
rights guaranteed by the Constitution, to assure the uniformity of federal law,
and to maintain the constitutional distribution of powers in our federal union.
The cases which it is the primary duty of the Court to decide are those
that, by hypothesis, present the most fundamental and difficult issues of law
and judgment."

The critics of the Freund Committee Report take issue with this
formulation of the Supreme Court's institutional place in the
United States. Former Justice Arthur Goldberg has stated most
eloquently what for many represents another important function of
the Court:
It is perhaps the greatest virtue of the Supreme Court as it now functions that
it serves as a guarantee to all citizens of whatever estate, race or color, that
our highest court is open for consideration of their claim that equal and relevant justice under the Constitution is being denied them.
43.

F. FRANKFURTER

& J. LANDIS, supra note 20, at 2.

44. REPORT, supra note 17, at 1.
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. * * The Committee's proposal would deny to Americans their historic
right to take every case raising substantial constitutional questions to the
highest court in the land.
I profoundly believe that the Supreme Court as it now functions in discharging its great responsibilities
under the Constitution is the ultimate guard45
ian of our liberties.

Another critic has cautioned that "[u]nder the Freund proposal,
those doors will close. Power will shift to the palace guard. Citizens
will stop appealing to the Supreme Court, stop listening to it and
believing in it, and eventually stop obeying it.""4
Responding to such criticism, Professor Bickel, a member of the
Freund panel, contends that these lofty goals, though desirable, are
not realistic.47 Bickel points out that throughout history a gradual
erosion in access to the Supreme Court has been a necessary concomitant to population growth, industrialization, and bureaucratization. 8 In view of the increased volume of Court business, Bickel
believes that restricted access is a "fact of life" that we must acknowledge and with which we must learn to cope.49
The pivotal difference between the Freund Committee's position and that of its critics lies in the particular weights each assigns
to the Court's largely symbolic role as the ultimate dispenser of
0 Identifying
justice within the American judicial system.A
the sacrifices that are acceptable in order to maintain this limited function
seems to constitute the crucial point of disagreement between those
who advocate a National Court of Appeals and those who wish to
preserve the right of litigants to seek Supreme Court review. Interestingly enough, this same conflict surfaced at the time the Judges'
Bill was considered by Congress. Chief Justice Taft, a spokesman
for the viewpoint that the Supreme Court should involve itself only
in matters of public importance, 51 provided major leadership in the
45. Goldberg, supra note 4, at 16.
46. Westen, supra note 37, at 32.
47. "[Y]es, it is pretty to think so. But it is not true. It cannot be true in a nation of
220,000,000 people . . .served by one Supreme Court." Bickel, The Overworked Court: A
Reply to Arthur J. Goldberg, THE NEW REPUBLic, Feb. 17, 1973, at 18.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Compare note 45 supra and accompanying text with note 47 supra and accompanying text.
51. See Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., ser.
33, at 2 (1922); Taft, Possibleand Needed Reforms in the Administrationof Civil Justice in
the Federal Courts, 57 AM. L. Rav. 1, 5-6 (1923). See generally F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDiS,
supra note 20, at 255-86. Prior to his accession as Chief Justice, Taft had urged similar views
about the Court's appropriate role. See 10 RiCHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 7903-04 (1914). For a case analysis of the degree of importance of questions presented
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ultimate drafting and adoption of the Judges' Bill. It was entirely
consistent with his philosophy of the Court's role that its obligatory
jurisdiction could be restricted without significant loss. Opponents
of the Taft position, on the other hand, like the modem critics of
the Freund Committee proposal, feared that limiting access to the
high court would diminish its role as the guardian of cherished
52
values .
The 1925 Act was characterized early as a total victory for the
Taft position-that the Supreme Court sat to resolve legal questions
of national significance rather than to do justice in particular
cases. 53 In their respected work on the Supreme Court, Frankfurter
and Landis described the triumph as follows:
At the heart of the proposal was the conservation of the Supreme Court as the
arbiter of legal issues of national significance. But this object could hardly be
attained so long as there persisted the obstinate conception that the Court was
to be the vindicator of all federal rights. This conception the Judges' Bill
completely overrode. Litigation which did not represent a wide public interest
was left to state courts of last resort and to the circuit courts of appeals, always
reserving to the Supreme Court power to determine that some national interest
justified invoking its jurisdiction.'

As the maelstrom over the Freund Committee proposal aptly demonstrates, however, the victory was somewhat less than total.
DiscretionaryReview
The original justification for expanding the Supreme Court's
screening function was the necessity of reducing the excessive backlog of cases, which under then existing jurisdictional statutes55 required plenary disposition by the Court. The 1925 Act sought to
make more manageable the workload of the Court by placing docket
control largely in the hands of the Justices. Unfortunately, very
little discussion about the specific method of controlling the docket
apparently occurred during congressional consideration of the
Judges' Bill.17 Presumably because judicial reform has such a nonpartisan ring to it-especially when the lobbyists are sitting Suto the Court during one term see Note, The Court, the Bar, and Certiorariat October Term,
1958, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1160, 1169 (1960).
52. E.g., 66 CONG. REc. 2928 (1925) (remarks of Senator Heflin of Alabama).
53. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
54. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 20, at 260-61.
55. For a summary of the jurisdictional legislation that regulated Supreme Court review
prior to the Judiciary Act of 1925 see F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 20, at 255-73.
56. See generally Strong, supra note 18.
57. See Leiman, The Rule of Four, 57 COLUM. L. Rv. 975, 985 (1957).
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preme Court Justices-Congress accepted uncritically the statute
presented by the draftsmen. Although Senator Spencer did enquire
in the Senate hearings whether Congress should attempt to define
more precisely the situations in which certiorari should be granted,s
the Justices resisted such restriction of their discretionary authority. Noting that the Court would not exercise a "choice or will in
granting or refusing the writ," Justice Van Devanter characterized
the process as "a sound judicial discretion" in which the members
of the Court would review the briefs and screen "according to recognized principles."59
Frankfurter and Landis evidently realized that the ambiguity
inherent in the process of determining what matters were of "national concern" was a potential source of conflict, but they justified
the flexibility on the ground that further precision was impossible."0
It should be recognized, however, that the kind of decisions a Justice
makes in determining whether to grant reView are significantly different from the considerations relevant to a decision on the merits.
The standard of "importance" articulated by Chief Justice Taft
and embraced by the Freund Committee members is deceptive.
When screening a petition a Justice not only must weigh the significance of the legal issues involved, but also must consider such ancillary questions as whether the particular case raises the issues in a
suitable way, whether the parties are adequately represented by
counsel, how the other Justices likely will view the merits of the
case, and how legal theory and precedent are developed at the particular time." Admittedly, the Court has attempted to establish
standards to guide its exercise of certiorari discretion;" but most
1924 Senate Hearings 31-32.
Id. at 32.
"[S]uch issues appear in myriad forms and no general classification of cases can
forecast the specific instances deserving the Court's ultimate judgment." F.
FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 20, at 257; cf. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183
(1971) (standardless imposition of death penalty not violative of due process in view of the
historical difficulty of anticipating and codifying those situations in which death sentence is
appropriate).
61. "Importance is a relative factor, dependent upon the type of issue involved, the way
in which it was decided below, the status of the law on the matter, the correctness of the
decision below, and the nature and number of persons who may be affected by the case. ...
Where the writ of certiorari is granted, a combination of factors is usually present to lead the
Court to believe that the case is sufficiently important to warrant further review." R. STERN
& E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRAcTIcE 167 (4th ed. 1969).
62. U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 19, 398 U.S. 1030 (1969), which outlines the types of reasons that
will be considered by the Court in passing upon a certiorari petition, reads in part as follows:
1. A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion,
and will be granted only where there are special and important reasons therefor. The
58.
59.
60.
hope to
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authorities now would agree that the guidelines hardly provide a
penetrating insight into the kinds of cases the Court will consider
63
important and on what basis.
The unpredictable nature of the certiorari granting process is
nothing new. Lawyers faced with drafting certiorari petitions long
have felt that favorable action on their petitions was at best a hit
or miss proposition."4 The annual surveys conducted twenty years
ago by Professor Harper and his associates 5 have made it abundantly apparent that considerably more is involved in the screening
function than the supporters of the Judges' Bill were willing to
admit to Congress. The principles that Justice Van Devanter had
called "recognized" 6 in fact were quite unarticulable and opaque to
Professor Harper's searching inquiry into the Court's certiorari practice. Clearly much more is at stake in determining the "certworthiness" of a particular case than application of the standard of importance." Indeed, in even the most clearly defined area in which the
Supreme Court has said that review is appropriate-the resolution
of conflicts among circuits 6 -the Court often has refused to grant
review.6"
following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate
the character of reasons which will be considered:
(a) Where a state court has decided a federal question of substance not theretofore
determined by this court, or has decided it in a way probably not in accord with applicable decisions of this court.
(b) Where a court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with the decision
of another court of appeals on the same matter; or has decided an important state or
territorial question in a way in conflict with applicable state or territorial law; or has
decided an important question of federal law which has not been, but should be, settled
by this court; or has decided a federal question in a way in conflict with applicable
decisions of this court; or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call
for an exercise of this court's power of supervision.
Id. at 1030-31.
63. See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 61, at 152-54; cf. Frankfurter & Hart, The
Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1933, 48 HARv. L. REv. 238, 262 (1934). See
also Harlan, supra note 36, at 549 (noting that "[firequently the question whether a case is
'certworthy' is more a matter of 'feel' than of precisely ascertainable rules").
64. See R. STERN & E. GaEssMq, supra note 61, at 153. See generally Prettyman,
Petitioning the United States Supreme Court-A Primerfor Hopeful Neophytes, 51 VA. L.
REv. 582 (1965).
65. See note 8 supra.
66. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
67. See Gressman, The National Court of Appeals: A Dissent, 59 A.B.A.J. 253, 256-57
(1973); Henkin, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term-Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HIIv. L.
Rav. 63, 88-92 (1968).
68. See note 62 supra; Harlan, Some Aspects of the JudicialProcess in the Supreme
Court of the United States, 33 AusTL. L.J. 108, 111 (1959).
69. See, e.g., Olff v. Eastside Union High School Dist., 404 U.S. 1042 (1972) (Douglas,
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If these docketing decisions actually were "legal" in the sense
that they sought to apply generally recognized principles to the
issue of "importance," they would be indefensible as unprincipled,
especially in view of the increasingly stringent demands by the
Court itself for certainty and predictability in the exercise of discretionary powers by government officials.10 Surely if petition screening
itself were based on "recognized principles," the Court could develop more precise rules to govern its own management of the process. After all, only a decade after they had prepared the 1925 statute broadening their own discretionary powers, those same Justices
who opposed any legislative guidance or restrictions on the Court's
71
exercise of discretionary power voted to hold New Deal legislation
unconstitutional as an illegal delegation of congressional power.
The screening function has evolved into an important element
of the Court's work that requires the Justices to perform a jurisdictional role in reviewing cases. Although Congress might have reduced the Court's case load by circumscribing the Court's jurisdiction, what Frankfurter and Landis72 call the "obstinate conception"
of the Court as the "vindicator of all federal rights" remained with
many members of Congress. 73 The legislative branch was even unwilling to grant total discretion to the Court and specified areas
where appellate jurisdiction was to remain obligatory.7 4 The Justices
may have perceived expanded certiorari jurisdiction as a politically
expedient means of avoiding sensitive dialogue with Congress about
the specific ground rules that would govern certiorari procedure.
The more specific the Justices had been, the more likely they would
have run into resistance from those who still felt that the High Court
J., dissenting). See generally Stem, Denial of CertiorariDespite a Conflict, 66 HAiv. L. REv.
465 (1953).
70. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of federal aid by
welfare officials violates due process absent pre-termination evidentiary hearing); Holmes v.
New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968) (due process requires that city
housing authority allocate low-rent public housing pursuant to ascertainable standards);
Hornsby v. Allen, 330 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964) (licensing authority cannot select licensees on
basis of uncontrolled discretion and whim or without established standards); Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1968), a/I'd, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969) (standard of
misconduct overly vague to support suspension).
71. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (§ 3 of the
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 held an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power to the executive); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (National Industrial Recovery Act).
72. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
73. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
74. See note 7 supra. See also Note, supra note 11, at 703.
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should remain the ultimate guardian of individual rights." The
strategy employed by the Justices in 1925, then, in fact skirted a
political flap with Congress by asking essentially for a vote of confidence in the institution of the Supreme Court while leaving to the
Justices the task of defining and refining the jurisdictional priorities
on the High Court's time and energies. 76 The kinds of jurisdictional
decisions that Congress normally makes for the federal judiciary as
a whole it delegated to the Justices through passage of the 1925 Act.
The political strategy and the result accomplished thereby are a
classic outcome of the delegation of political authority by one
branch of government to another.
Inasmuch as procedure often is a means of effecting substantive
policy, 77 the significance of the jurisdictional power conferred on the
Court cannot be minimized. The current critics of the Freund Committee proposal have learned from the experience of the past fifty
years that power to control screening is the power to modify the role
of the Supreme Court. The legislative abdication of 1925, far from
being a total victory for the forces of limited review, merely shifted
the forum of contention from the political arena of Congress to the
less visible, but nonetheless political, chambers of the Supreme
Court. In short, the reform mechanism of discretionary jurisdiction
resulted in a compromise by which the Court itself became more
politicized. The certiorari procedure permitted the Justices to
thrash out internally and on an ad hoc basis the appropriate role of
the Court. Rather than institutionalizing the viewpoint of Taft and
Frankfurter that the Court had a restricted role, the ambiguity of
the jurisdictional legislation merely transferred from the Congress
to the Court the locus of decision-making authority as to what cases
would be heard, and simultaneously transformed a very substantial
portion of the Court's work into outright political decision-making.
Following the passage of the 1925 Act, the Taft institutional
position was pressed by the Chief Justice and then-Professor Frankfurter. 7 After his appointment to the Court, Frankfurter took up the
fight from within. The early cases arising under the Federal Em75.

See Freund, Why We Need the National Court of Appeals, 59 A.B.A.J. 247, 249

(1973).
76. See 59 A.B.A.J. 724, 728 (1973) (remarks of retired Chief Justice Warren): The
purpose of certiorari jurisdiction is "to permit the Court not only to achieve control of its
docket but also to establish our national priorities in constitutional and legal matters."
77. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 20, at 2.
78. Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1928,
43 HARV. L. REv. 33 (1929).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

ployer's Liability Act (FELA) 9 and the Jones Act"0 epitomize the
fundamental disagreement that arose among the Justices in determining what cases warranted review.8 1 The division these cases created within the Court evidenced the internal power struggle that
discretionary jurisdiction helped to promote. The decision to grant
review as a matter of "sound judicial discretion" left the Justices
free to vote for or against review on the basis of their own perceptions of the appropriate role of the Court.
A bloc of Justices with sufficient power to control the reviewgranting process felt that the Court should hear a significant number of the FELA and Jones Act cases that were presented for review." Under FELA, which is the exclusive source of reimbursement
for a covered worker who sustains a work-related injury,8 3 railroad
liability to workers rests upon a finding of negligence.8 4 Although the
federal statute eliminates such common law defenses as contributory negligence85 and assumption of risk,88 the worker must show
some breach of duty to recover.8" In the controversial FELA cases,
the issue facing the Court normally involved the propriety of a lower
court determination that the evidence adduced by the workerplaintiff was insufficient to warrant submission of the case to the
jury.u Indeed, all but one of the 37 certiorari petitions granted in
FELA cases during the seventeen terms of court from 1938 to 1954
were filed by employees who had lost on this issue below. 9
79. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970).
80. Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970) (extends the provisions of the
FELA to seamen). See generally Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325 (1960).
81. See, e.g., Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S. 107 (1959); Harris
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 361 U.S. 15 (1959) (per curiam); Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S.
500 (1957); Schulz v. Pennsylvania R.R., 350 U.S. 523 (1956); Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336
U.S. 53 (1949). See also Gallick v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372 U.S. 108 (1963).
82. See Note, Supreme Court CertiorariPolicy in Cases Arising Under the FELA, 69
HARv. L. Rzv. 1441-47 (1956).
83. New York Cent. R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917).
84. See Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 69 (1949).
85. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1970); see Ganotis v. New York
Cent. R.R., 342 F.2d 767 (6th Cir. 1965).
86. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1970); see Schirra v. Delaware, L.
& W.R.R., 103 F. Supp. 812 (M.D. Pa. 1952).
87. See Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958).
88. See, e.g., New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. Henegan, 364 U.S. 441 (1960), rev'g per
curiam 272 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1959); Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645 ( 1946), reu'g 354 Mo.
196, 189 S.W.2d 253 (1945); Tenant v. Peoria & P.U. Ry., 321 U.S. 29 (1944), revg 134 F.2d
860 (7th Cir. 1943). See generally De Parcq, The Supreme Court and the FederalEmployers'
LiabilityAct, 1960-1961 Term, 39 Cm.-KENT L. Rav. 127 (1962).
89. See Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 361 U.S. 15, 16 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Note, supra note 82, at 1446. For a further breakdown of the relevant statistics with respect
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The FELA cases brought an anguished and sometimes embittered response from Justice Frankfurter, who eventually refused to
participate in the decision-making process." Frankfurter argued
that the FELA cases entailed the resolution of specific factual questions and therefore were not sufficiently generalized in terms of
principle to warrant Supreme Court review.' Chief Justice Hughes,
a supporter of the Frankfurter-Taft conception of the Supreme
Court's role, stated in 1937 that "[i]f further review is to be had
by the Supreme Court it must be because of the public interest in
the questions involved. . .. Review by the Supreme Court is thus
in the interest of the law, its appropriate exposition and enforcement, not in the mere interest of the litigants. 912 Chief Justice Vinson similarly asserted in 1949 that the "Supreme Court is not, and
never has been, primarily concerned with the correction of errors in
lower court decisions. 5' 3 Notwithstanding the objections of some of
its members, the Court noted in the FELA cases that it was
"[c]ognizant of the duty to effectuate the intention of the Congress
to the FELA cases see Douglas, The Supreme Court and Its Case Load, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 401,
404 (1960).
90. See, e.g., McBride v. Toledo R.R., 354 U.S. 517 (1957); Ferguson v. MooreMcCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521 ( 1957); Anderson v. Atlantic Coast Line R'R., 350 U.S.
807 (1955); United States v. Shannon, 342 U.S. 288 (1952); Moore v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry.,
340 U.S. 573 (1951); Affolder v. New York, C. & St. L.R.R., 339 U.S. 96 (1950); Hill v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 336 U.S. 911 (1949). See also Frankfurter & Landis, The Supreme Court
Under the JudiciaryAct of 1925, 42 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1928). Justice Frankfurter did participate on occasion, however, where his fifth vote was required for a ruling in favor of the
employer. See Inman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 361 U.S. 138 (1959).
91. "For the Supreme Court of the United States to spend two hours of solemn argument, plus countless other hours reading the briefs and record and writing opinions, to
determine whether there was evidence to support an allegation that it could reasonably be
foreseen that an ice-cream server on a ship would use a butcher's knife to scoop out ice cream
that was too hard to be scooped with a regular scoop, is surely to misconceive the discretion
that was entrusted to the wisdom of the Court for the control of its calendar.
"It is, I believe, wholly accurate to say that the Court will be enabled to discharge
adequately the vital ... responsibility it bears for the general welfare only if it restricts its
reviewing power to the adjudication of constitutional issues or other questions of national
importance .

. . ."

Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 546-47 (1957)

(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 530 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); cf. Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959) (Justice
Frankfurter, dissenting, argues that the circuit courts of appeals are final arbiters in diversity
cases and accordingly that Supreme Court review of such cases should not be granted). See
also Frankfurter, The Business of the Supreme Court of the United States-A Study in the
FederalJudicialSystem (pt. v.), 39 HARv. L. Rav. 1046, 1065-67 (1926).
92. S. REP. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1937).
93. Address by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson Before the American Bar Association, Sept.
7, 1949, in 69 S. Ct. v, vi (1949).
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to secure the right to a jury determination"94 and expressed its desire to be "vigilant to exercise its power of review in any case where
it appears that the litigants have been improperly deprived of that
95
determination."
In a foreword to the HarvardLaw Review's survey of the 1957
Term, Professor Brown observed that the "present Court views its
certiorari jurisdiction as having a different, or at least an added,
function-that the Court now sits also, if not principally, as a Court
of Selected Error."96 Moreover, former Chief Justice Warren recently has acknowledged explicitly that rendering "summary justice" where the Justices deem it "appropriate" is an essential
function of the Court.97 The FELA cases indicated that the victory
claimed by Frankfurter and Taft in the aftermath of the 1925 Act
was instead a step in the direction of increased Court autonomy
which led to politicization of the decisions of docket control. Since
decisions of "importance" in granting or denying review were never
considered decisions of the Court for purposes of stare decisis, 5
whenever a sufficient number of Justices felt that the Court should
hear a case, regardless of its scope, the open-ended certiorari procedure enabled that faction to prevail on purely political grounds.
Accordingly, an individual Justice's vote on certiorari legitimately
could reflect his own views without the institutional restraints normally imposed by precedent. Because there could be no resort to
"principle," the issue was decided solely on the basis of the political
influence and power of individual Justices or factions within the
Court.99
94. Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 509 (1957).
95. Id.
96. Brown, supra note 11, at 78.
97. 59 A.B.A.J. 721, 729 (1973); cf. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2614 n.3 (1973);
Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
98. "The denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits
of the case, as the bar has been told many times." United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482,
490 (1923); see Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370, 379 n.8 (1957) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 497 (1953); Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show,
Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 917-20 (1950) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). See also Harper & Rosenthal,
supra note 8, at 297; Address by Justice Brennan, Pennsylvania Bar Association Annual
Meeting, Feb. 3, 1960, in 31 PA. B.A.Q. 393, 402-03 (1960).
99. The kind of restraint imposed by precedent is well illustrated by the concurring
opinions of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist in White v. Weiser, 93
S. Ct. 2348 (1973) (a congressional redistricting case). In Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526
(1969), the Court had established mathematical precision as the standard of population
equality for congressional apportionment. InMahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973), the Court
held that the Kirkpatrickrigidity did not apply to state apportionment situations. In Weiser
the Court distinguished Mahan, reaffirming the principle established in Kirkpatrick; the

19731

SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION

Screening as a Passive Virtue
The early advocates of discretionary Supreme Court review
apprehended the ambiguity of the guidelines and the uncertainty of
the practice, but justified on grounds of expediency the failure to
develop a common law of petition review. 00 The mystery of the
review-granting process is exacerbated by the failure of the Court
to indicate its grounds for refusing to grant a hearing.10' Indeed,
stating reasons for each denial of certiorari doubtless would add an
intolerable burden to the work of the Justices and their clerks.0 2 But
if the screening process does turn so heavily on political factors, the
members of the Court might find being bound by such "legal" precedent unacceptable. This concern may more accurately explain the
Court's reluctance to specify its grounds for denying certiorari. As
things stand, the mystery of the procedure retains a maximum of
flexibility for the Court and for the individual Justices and permits
them to rely on subjective factors like expediency that traditionally
have not been deemed appropriate considerations in the judicial
realm.
In an influential article written about ten years ago,"0 3 Professor
Bickel attempted to come to grips with the not-so-judicial modes of
decision-making sometimes utilized by the Supreme Court. Bickel
expressly advocated that the Court employ techniques of
expediency in disposing of cases that otherwise might establish
unwanted principles.'"4 For Bickel, the Court's certiorari jurisdiction
concurring justices found Kirkpatrick controlling and voted with the other members of the
Court, but they noted that they disagreed with the rule enunciated in Kirkpatrick. Only in
deference to the constraint of precedent did they vote for affirmance. Cf. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 397 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
100. "[It has been suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons
for denial. Practical considerations preclude. . . .If the Court is to do its work it would not
be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The time that would
be required is prohibitive, apart from the fact . . . that different reasons not infrequently
move different members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at a particular time
makes review undesirable." Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 918 (1950)
(opinion of Frankfurter, J.). See also Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Group of Institutional
Investors, 343 U.S. 982 (1952); Bondholders, Inc. v. Powell, 342 U.S. 921 (1952).
101. See Harper & Leibowitz, supra note 8, at 432; Harper & Pratt, supra note 8, at
440.
102. The Freund Committee does suggest, however, that brief statements about reasons
for granting or denying review would be useful to the bar. REPORT, supra note 17, at 23.
103. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv.
L. Ray. 40 (1961).
104. Id. at 56-57. Professor Bickel has stated that "[olur democratic system of government exists in [the] . . .tension between principle and expediency, and within it judicial
review must play its role." A. BicKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF

PoLrncs 68 (1962).
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represented an excellent mechanism to avoid deciding cases for reasons of political expediency through open political manipulation of
the Court's docket.1 15 Far from apologizing for the lack of standards
and ambiguity, Bickel viewed them as virtues-albeit passive
ones. ' In this respect, Bickel's position departed from earlier explanations of the Court's exercise of its certiorari power.
Professor Bickel begins his article with the observation that a
society cannot long survive unless it makes liberal use of the art of
compromise.' 7 He concedes that the Supreme Court must decide
the merits of a case according to neutral principles,0 8 since in its
decision-making process the Court derives its legitimacy from its
use of principle in contrast to the expediency that often informs the
legislative process in the face of a need for compromise. 9 He argues,
however, that requiring neutral principles for the preliminary determination of whether to make a decision on the merits would eliminate the flexibility necessary for compromise. This decision-when
to refrain from confronting a case or an issue-need not be principled in the same way that decisions on the merits are." 0
Bickel notes that the Court has open to it three courses of action
in any situation: it can validate (and therefore legitimate); it can
invalidate; or it can do neither."' Application of the rule of neutral
principles to the determination of whether to decide a case would
effectively reduce the Court's ability to avoid legitimating, on the
basis of principle, political decisions made by the political institutions on the ground of expediency. Thus Bickel argues that a Court
may not be able to articulate a satisfactory principle that would
allow invalidation of a political act. By the same token, however, it
105. Bickel, supra note 103, at 46. A "literal reliance on Marbury v. Madison," Bickel
observes, would lead to a "rampant activism" on the part of the Court. Id. at 47.
106. Professor Gunther has described Bickel's "prudential considerations" as "lawdebasing." Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"--A Comment on Principle
and Expediency in JudicialReview, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 13 (1964). The emphasis on political
consequences, Gunther believes, "confuses the probable impacts of adjudication with the
proper ingredients of the adjudicatory process," and jeopardizes the "integrity of the Court's
principled process." Id. at 15-16.
107. "No good society can be unprincipled; and no viable society can be principleridden." Bickel, supra note 103, at 49.
108. See Bickel, supra note 103, at 48. "A principled decision. . . is one that rests on
reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and their
neutrality transcend any immediate result that is resolved." Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 19 (1959). See also Hart, the Supreme Court,
1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARv. L. RFv. 84, 99 (1959).
109. Bickel, supra note 103, at 49.
110. Id. at 51.
111. Id. at 50; see A. BiCKEL, supra note 104, at 69.
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should avoid for political reasons the added sanction that would
result from putting the prestige of its imprimatur of principle behind a politically expedient decision." 2 As Bickel indicates, the
compromise of avoidance is one way of side-stepping the establish3
ment of unwanted principle."
The Bickel thesis is an extension of the Taft view that the
Supreme Court should concern itself only with issues of broad constitutional significance. Bickel, however, goes well beyond the original Taft thrust in stating candidly that the "mediating devices" by
which the Court avoids decision-making cannot themselves be principled. For Bickel, this does not mean "unchanneled, undirected,
unchartered discretion;" ' 4 nor does it mean "impulse, hunch, sentiment, [or] predilection ....,,11
What it does represent is "prud6
ence.""
Treatment of the Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction as
expressly political is perhaps the logical culmination of Taft's philosophy that the Court should function solely as the arbiter of issues
of national significance, rather than as the "vindicator of all federal
rights.""' 7 Labeling the process political, however, does not resolve
the basic question of when a case-if not unimportant-is inappropriate for Supreme Court consideration and resolution. 18 An assumption that the members of the Supreme Court have a homogeneous view of desirable social policy seems to underlie Bickel's thesis."' Accordingly, Professor Bickel's position, while a good deal
112. "It is no small matter. . . to 'legitimate' a legislative measure. The Court's prestige, the spell it casts as a symbol, enables it to entrench and solidify measures that may have
been tentative in the conception or that are on the verge of abandonment in the execution.
The Court, regardless of what it intends, can generate consent and may impart permanence."
Bickel, supra note 103, at 48.
113. Id. at 56-57.
114. Id. at 51.
115. Id.
116. Id. See note 106 supra; cf. note 59 supra and accompanying text.
117. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
118. For an incisive critique of Professor Bickel's arguments see Gunther, supra note
106.
119. For example, it is likely that Justices Douglas and Rehnquist have different political views concerning sound social policy, and President Nixon has made it clear in his public
statements that the Justices he appoints to the Supreme Court will have political philosophies at variance with those of the Warren era. The unanimous jury cases point up the
problem. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404
(1972). Only a relatively few states provided for criminal convictions by less than unanimous
vote. Deciding that these non-unanimous jury statutes were constitutional had the legitimating effect that Bickel described; but while this may be an "unwanted principle" to some, it
is apparent that others sought to establish the constitutional legitimacy of non-unanimous
criminal juries precisely because of the ripple effect that such a decision would have in
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more sophisticated than that advanced at the time of the enactment
of the Judges' Bill, suffers from the notion that there is a single welldefined end for society. Although the questionable validity of this
assumption may raise serious doubts about the value of the Bickel
formulation for institutional guidance, it does, of course, assist individual Justices in deciding when to vote in favor of review.
Screening and the Court's Legitimacy

In 1925, discretionary jurisdiction was envisaged as a means of
enabling the Court to single out matters of "importance." It was
assumed that members of the Court could agree easily on which
cases fell into this category. Experience has shown, however, that
this basis for determining certworthiness was an invitation for politicizing the review-granting process. In recognition of this fact,
Bickel has urged that the process be treated as frankly political and
sets forth an institutional rationale for so treating it.120 The passive
virtues concept, however, relies heavily on Bickel's belief that the
proper role of the Supreme Court is to define and vindicate broad
constitutional principles, rather than to do justice in individual
cases. Accordingly, the concept does not seem to give adequate consideration to conflicting views about the Court's appropriate role.
Professor Deutsch indicates this in explaining that acceptance
of Supreme Court decisions does not derive solely from their being
principled adjudications, but also comes from the credibility of the
Court as a safeguarder of constitutional liberties.1 21 Deutsch uses
this analysis to argue that Bickel's line-drawing between the Court's
2
avoidance of decision on the merits and its per curiam practice' 1
23
(early examined and criticized by Professor Brown) is artificial
because the per curiams-though formally decisions on the mernumerous states. Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (no newsman's testimonial
privilege under the first amendment).
120. See note 107 supra.
121. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court:Some IntersectionsBetween Law and PoliticalScience, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169, 216 (1968). See also Burger & Warren,
Retired Chief Justice Warren Attacks, Chief Justice Burger Defends Freund Study Group's
Composition and Proposal, 59 A.B.A.J. 724, 730 (1973) (remarks of retired Chief Justice
Warren); Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75
YALE L.J. 517, 562-66 (1966).
122. Per curiam adjudication of the type discussed is a method of disposing of cases on
the basis of preliminary papers normally without full briefing and argument. See Harper &
Pratt, supra note 8, at 446-51.
123. See Brown, supra note 11, at 82-93. See also Per CuriamDecisions of the Supreme
Court: 1958 Term, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 128 (1959).
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its-are simply devices for re-establishing the Court's credibility.' 24
In this way, Deutsch argues, the per curiams are also "mediating
devices" and thus should be evaluated in political terms, free from
the requirement of principled adjudication.' 25 The important point
for the present discussion is that there still exists significant disagreement whether avoidance invariably entails compromise, and if
so, whether the competing value of credibility often might not be
sacrificed in the process. 2 A realization of this conflict points up
both the continuing controversy of the FELA cases-whether the
Court should sit to remedy specific injustices-and the naivete of
the Bickel assumption that somehow the members of the Court will
12
be able to reach a consensus on what is a desirable policy outcome. 1
Professor Deutsch's critique of Bickel also provides a useful
perspective for the controversy between the Freund Committee and
its critics. As previously discussed, the Study Group Report acknowledges that the proposed National Court of Appeals closely
conforms to the Taft-Frankfurter conception of the Supreme Court's
role. r2 By placing initial screening responsibilities with an intermediate body, the proposal imposes restraint on the Supreme Court.
The institutionalized system of selecting sitting federal appellate
judges would make the National Court of Appeals less susceptible
to political influence through the process of appointment.' 21 Moreover, since the high court would retain its ability to deny review even
of cases passed on to it by the lower court, the intermediate court
could not bind the Supreme Court to hear any case or review any
issue. While a petitioner under the proposed system would have to
clear a double hurdle before obtaining review, a party seeking to
block review would need to prevail only at one level. Thus the
124. Deutsch, supra note 121, at 212. Cf. note 97 supra.
125. Deutsch, supra note 121, at 221.
126. Cf. Henkin, supra note 67, at 87. Professor Henkin questions whether the Court's
avoidance of the controversial legal issues posed by the Vietnam War did not undermine its
credibility. Similarly, the Court's refusal to have resolved the Pentagon Papers Case, New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), or the Amchitka nuclear detonation
case, Committee on Nuclear Responsibility v. Schlesinger, 404 U.S. 917 (1971), would have
raised serious doubts about the Court's credibility. For the same reasons, people confidently
predict that the Court ultimately will hear and decide the question of executive privilege
raised by the Watergate tapes.
127. If there is significant disagreement among members of the Court as to a desirable
policy outcome, then the use of unprincipled mediating devices becomes highly questionable
since it resolves intra-Court conflict according to a process that may endanger the integrity
of the Court's work. See generally Gunther, supra note 106, at 15-16.
128. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
129. See REPORT, supra note 17, at 19-20.
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screening function, admittedly politicized, would be less exposed to
political influences, and the new court would establish a structural
bias against review.
Even more striking in the ongoing controversy is the notion that
the Supreme Court's credibility might be compromised by implementation of the Freund Committee proposal. As recognized some
fifteen years ago by Professor Brown'30 and as reiterated by former
Chief Justice Warren,' 3' the Court can play an important role as a
Court of Selected Error. Professor Deutsch has observed that such
a function helps to build support for the Court's decisions because
of the increased credibility it achieves as a doer of justice.1 32 Indeed,
the function of the Court as a safeguarder of individual liberties is
emphasized consistently by critics of the Freund Committee,'33 and
it is very clear that the National Court of Appeals effectively would
cut off from Supreme Court review those cases in which the principles involved might not be of general significance but in which
specific individual liberties might have been compromised.'34 On the
other hand, the position taken by Bickel, and evidently by the
Freund Committee collectively, is that the legitimacy of the Court's
actions stems from its use of neutral principles in deciding cases and
resolving disputes.' 5 If the Freund Committee's critics and Professor Deutsch are correct that part of the Court's legitimacy derives
from the credibility it builds by dispensing justice in individual
cases, then the Committee's proposal might impair the effectiveness
of the Court and undermine its national respect. The Committee
seems to have been aware of the need to allow the Supreme Court
to decline review of cases certified by the National Court of Appeals
as a means of achieving compromise by avoiding decisions.'36 The
question posed by the critics and this analysis, however, is whether
the Committee was sufficiently sensitive to another sort of accommodation necessary for political ends-the necessity that the
Court's "door . . . remain open to all people and to all claims of
' 37
injustice.'
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Brown, supra note 11, at 78.
59 A.B.A.J. 721, 729 (1973).
See Deutsch, supra note 121, at 216; Gunther, supra note 106, at 25.
See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 4, at 16; Gressman, supra note 67, at 257.
See REPORT, supra note 17, at 18.
See A. BICKEL, supra note 104.
See id. at 22.
59 A.B.A.J. 721, 730 (1973) (remarks of retired Chief Justice Warren).
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The Rule of Four
When the Justices presented their reform bill to Congress, they
indicated that every petition for review would be examined by each
member of the Court' 8 and that the votes of four Justices would
suffice for a grant of review.'39 Justice Van Devanter, as a spokesman
for the Court, assured members of Congress that the vote of four
Justices would always grant review and that in some instances the
vote of three would suffice. 4 0 In the opinion of Professor Freund,
these assurances were necessary to allay the serious misgivings that
existed about the substitution of discretionary for obligatory Supreme Court jurisdiction."'
Although remarkably little has been written about the so-called
rule of four,4 2 there has been considerable divergence of opinion
about what effect the rule should have on the review granting process.' This disagreement about the meaning of the rule of four is
138. See H. R. REP. No. 1075, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 ( 1925).
139. "For instance, if there were five votes against granting the petition and four in
favor of granting it, it would be granted, because we proceed upon the theory that when as
many as four members of the court, and even three in some instances, are impressed with
the propriety of our taking the case the petition should be granted. This is the uniform way
in which petitions for writs of certiorari are considered." 1924 Senate Hearings32 (remarks
of Mr. Justice Van Devanter).
140. H.R. REP. No. 1075, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1925); see note 139 supra and accompanying text. See also Hearings on S. 1392 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 490 (1937) (letter of Chief Justice Hughes).
141. See Freund, Why We Need the National Court of Appeals, 59 A.B.A.J. 247, 249
(1973).
142. Leiman, supra note 57, at 981 ("Research has yielded no evidence of its origins or
early history."); see Bailey v. Central Vt. R.R., 319 U.S. 350, 359 (1943); Hearingson S. 2176
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,74th Cong., 1st Sess., at 8, 9 (1935) (wherein Mr.
Justice Van Devanter observed that the rule of four "originated before almost all the members
of the Court thought of being there").
143. In some situations four Justices who feel that a case commends itself for review
might not insist on setting the case for argument because of their belief that the majority's
contrary view of the merits is unchangeable. See, e.g., LaValle v. Delle Rose, 410 U.S. 690,
695 (1973) (Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and Stewart, JJ., dissenting); Lippitt v. Cipollone,
404 U.S. 1032 (1972) (Douglas, Brennan, White, and Powell, JJ., dissenting). Moreover, four
Justices might agree that the Court should remand a case and consequently dissent from a
denial of certiorari. In Gay v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 2152 (1973), for example, Justices
Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and Stewart dissented from a denial of certiorari although
recognizing that no federal statute or constitutional issue was involved. They believed that
the Court should exercise its supervisory power over the federal courts to remand a case in
which they felt that the integrity of the disinterestedness of the judiciary was at stake.
Evidently the dissenting Justices believed that a full argument would have been futile in view
of the majority's attitude toward the merits of the case. The Gay case does, however, illustrate
how the Court can assume a role both as a doer of justice and as a preserver of judicial
propriety.
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yet another illustration of the different conclusions that follow from
different premises regarding the Supreme Court's function. The
issue arose most acutely in the FELA cases, in which Justice Frankfurter adopted the view that the rule of four was not a binding
command on the Court, but rather a working rule of thumb to which
the majority deferred. 44' Thus, for Justice Frankfurter, the fact that
four justices voted to grant review was "ample proof" that a case
raised a question of national importance and that the majority ac145
cordingly should accept this determination as a matter of policy.
But Justice Frankfurter refrained from voting on the merits in
FELA cases, 46 which he felt did not warrant Supreme Court review,
because as a class they involved individualized rather than generalized problems.'47 In his dissenting opinions he stated his belief that
the "reason for deference to a minority view no longer holds when a
class of litigation is given a special and privileged position."''
Justice Harlan, however, took a different view. In his opinion
the vote of four Justices sufficed to place a case properly before the
Court and to impose on the Court an obligation for principled adjudication. 49' This obligation was especially strong where a class of
cases systematically was taken for review against the wishes of the
majority because in those instances the majority could undercut the
principle of minority control of the screening process.' 5 °
In her article on the rule of four, Leiman concluded that Justice
Frankfurter's view-that the rule of four was not binding on the
majority but only a useful guide deserving of some deference-was
preferable.' 1 While recognizing that the Court's exercise of discretion in screening requires some safeguard, Leiman viewed Harlan's
approach as extreme and preferred to regard the four-vote rule as a
tool of delay, a means to force majority consideration but not dispo52
sition of a case or an issue.'
144. See Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 529 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Shannon, 342 U.S. 288, 296-97 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
145. Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 529 (1957).
146. See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
147. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
148. Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 529 (1957).
149. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500,
559 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting); accord, Bailey v. Central Vt. R.R., 319 U.S. 350, 358-59
(1943) (Stone, C.J., concurring).
150. 352 U.S. at 560; accord, Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Corp., 361 U.S. 107, 111
(1959) (Stewart, J., concurring).
151. Leiman, supra note 57, at 988.
152. Id.
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Justice Douglas, who believes that the rule of four represented
a compromise by the Justices of the Court in return for Congressional approval of expanded discretionary review, sees the rule of
four as a legally binding procedure governing screening.'5 3 Without
this safeguard of minority control over access to the Court, Congress, according to Douglas, would not have delegated to the Justices such broad discretionary authority."4 Professor Freund seemingly concedes this.'55 The fear that discretionary review would eliminate the function of the Court in administering "essential justice"' 56 led to institutionalizing a minority rule on granting review.
From this perspective the four-vote rule provides an objective measure of "importance." As Justice Douglas has written, "[m]inority
control, therefore, makes the present docket control tolerable."'' 7
Consistent with his position that the rule of four institutionalizes minority control of screening, Justice Douglas has stated that
when the Court has seven Justices sitting, only three must vote for
a grant of review.158 Although at the Senate hearings on the Judges'
Bill Justice Van Devanter mentioned that the vote of three Justices
would suffice for granting review in some circumstances, he was not
precise in explaining what those situations were."1 When only seven
Justices can participate in a case-either because of recusals or
vacancies on the Court-faithfulness to the minority control concept would lead to a rule of three. Justice Douglas has revealed that
60
this is in fact the Court's practice.'
153. Cf. Bickel, supra note 103, at 58.
154. See Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 361 U.S. 15, 18 & n.3 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
155. See Freund, supra note 141, at 249. See also Burton, Judging Is Also Administration, 21 TEMP. L.Q. 77, 84-85 (1947).
156. See Gressman, supra note 67, at 257.
157. Douglas, Managing the Docket of the Supreme Court of the United States, 25
RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 279, 298 (1970).
158. Id.
159. See notes 139 & 140 supra and accompanying text.
160. See Douglas, supra note 157, at 298. This practice was disregarded recently, however, in Stanley v. United States, 404 U.S. 996 (1971), wherein certiorari was denied despite
the strong dissents of Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart. The deaths of Justices Black
and Harlan at the outset of the 1971-72 Term left the court with only seven members, three
of whom should have been able to grant review. Petitioners in Stanley, who had been convicted for the possession and manufacture of LSD, sought Supreme Court review of an
affirmance of their convictions by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. United States
v. Stanley, 427 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1970). With three justices dissenting, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari, Stanley v. United States, 400 U.S. 936 (1970), but remanded the case to
the Ninth Circuit in accordance with suggestions contained in a memorandum filed by the
Solicitor General. On remand, the lower court adopted the rationale of Justice Douglas, who,
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Examples of built-in mechanisms for minority control of review
in other areas are numerous. For many years the Selective Service
System has allowed appeal of a draft classification to the President
as a matter of right if at least one member of the appeals board has
dissented from the registrant's classification. 6 ' Similarly, certain
cases are appealable of right to the New York State Court of Appeals
if a single judge in the intermediate appellate court dissents.' Evidencing its apparent awareness of the popular appeal of the minority rule screening device, the Freund Committee suggested that a
rule of three govern certification of cases to the Supreme Court from
the proposed seven-member National Court of Appeals. 1 3 This
would be one way of institutionalizing the Committee's belief that
"where there is serious doubt, the National Court of Appeals should
1 4 As Justice Douglas
certify a petition rather than [deny] review.""
6
5
has written about the rule of four, the Freund Committee seems
to regard the minority rule provision as a safeguard built into its
reform. 66
Thus, the rule of four seems implicitly related to the concept
of minority control of the docket, and the rule of three when only
6 7 Given
seven Justices are sitting seems to confirm the connection."
the vast authority conferred on the Supreme Court by the Judges'
Bill and the persistently "obstinate conception" that the Supreme
Court is a court of last resort for individuals deprived of federal
rights, the Douglas view of the binding, institutionalized effect of
the rule of four should be adopted. 68
in dissenting from the Court's grant of certiorari, had expressed an opinion on the merits of
the case. See United States v. Stanley, 446 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1971). When review of the
Ninth Circuit's disposition of the case again was sought, Chief Justice Burger apparently
voted with the previous dissenting Justices to deny certiorari. Why the case was not set for
argument was never explained by the Court. See also Donaldson v. California, 404 U.S. 968
(1971).
161. See 32 C.F.R. § 1627.1(b) (1972).
162. See N.Y. Civ. PnAc. § 5601(a) (McKinney 1963), as amended in part, N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. § 5601(a) (Cum. Supp. 1972).
163. See REPORT, supra note 17, at 21 & 23.
164. Id. at 21.
165. See Douglas, supra note 157, at 298.
166. "We believe our recommendation minimizes the chances of an erratic subjectivity.
There are safeguards in the method of designation of the judges; and if the vote of three of
the seven judges were to suffice for certification to the Supreme Court the concurrence of five
of the seven would be required to deny the certification." REPORT, supra note 17, at 23.
167. But see Leiman, supranote 57, at 982. The cases cited by Leiman arose when eight
members of the Court were sitting. Josephson v. United States, 333 U.S. 838 (1948); Scarborough v. Pennsyvania R.R., 326 U.S. 755 (1945).
168. Of course, those who share the limited Frankfurter view of the Supreme Court's
appropriate function likely would reject as a matter of policy the institutionalization of the
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Dismissalof the Writ as Improvidently Granted
The foregoing discussion of the Supreme Court's discretionary
jurisdiction, the Freund Committee's proposal for reform, and the
rule of four provides a framework within which to discuss a specific
practice used in disposing of a number of cases. The analysis now
turns to the Court's practice of issuing writs of certiorari that are
dismissed after full briefing and argument, without a decision on the
merits. Dismissals of certiorari as improvidently granted"' can influence the kinds of cases that receive principled adjudication on
the merits. Since a dismissal has the same effect as a denial of
certiorari in the first place, the question addressed in this section is
whether the same procedure and decision-making mode that characterize the initial screening process should be applied also to dismissals of certiorari as improvidently granted. '
The recent case of Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 170 is a forceful illustration of the potentially serious economic
consequences of a writ dismissal. In 1961 TWA filed an antitrust
suit against Hughes Tool Company. The district court 17 and the
Second Circuit 7 ' both found that TWA had stated grounds for recovery and that the order of the Civil Aeronautics Board qffecting
the relationship between TWA and its large stockholder, Hughes
Tool, did not constitute a valid defense to TWA's suit. Although it
granted certiorari 73 in 1964, the Supreme Court subsequently dis-.
74
missed the writ as improvidently granted after hearing argument.
Returned to the district court for further proceedings to determine
the amount of TWA's damages, 7 5 the case again was affirmed by
the Second Circuit. 7 The Supreme Court, which granted certiorari
in 1972,177 rendered a decision in January 1973, wherein it held that
rule of four to govern the screening process; but recognition of the "obstinate conception" that
Frankfurter deplored leads to the conclusion that any other view of the four-vote rule would
have been unacceptable politically in 1925 and probably would be so today. Cf. 59 A.B.A.J.
835 (1973) (comments of Justice Brennan); Goldberg, supra note 4; Gressman, supra note 67;
59 A.B.A.J. 724 (1973) (comments of Retired Chief Justice Warren); Westen, supra note 37.
169. See Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 526-27 n.4 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
170. 409 U.S. 363 (1973).
171. 32 F.R.D. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
172. 332 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1964).
173. 379 U.S. 912 (1964).
174. 380 U.S. 248 (1965). See 409 U.S. at 365 n.1.
175. 308 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes,
312 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (determination of award of attorney's fees).
176. 449 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1971).
177. 405 U.S. 915 (1972).
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the actions of Hughes Tool were immunized' 8 from the charges of
TWA because of the role played by the Civil Aeronautics Board.
Since the 1965 writ dismissal had no substantive precedential
weight, the Court dismissed the entire lawsuit.'79 As Chief Justice
Burger's dissent vividly points out, the issue of immunity was raised
before the Court in 1964,180 and the precedent that the .1973 Court
found dispositive already had been decided in 1963.181 Yet the costs
82
incurred during the years of protracted litigation were staggering.'
Although the Hughes Tool case underscores the potential economic impact of dismissing a writ as improvidently granted, the
significance of certiorari dismissals is not limited to the substantial
effects it may have on the individual litigants. As an element of
docket control, certiorari dismissals can affect the substance of the
Court's work. Timing of review and determining whether specific
substantive issues will be accorded principled adjudication can be
affected by the rules and procedures governing writ dismissal. In
1970, for example, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 3 to consider the question whether the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination requires transactional or testimonial immunity
before a witness can be compelled to give self-incriminating testimony. In Piccirillo v. New York 1 4 petitioner, who had been convicted of criminal assault on a policeman, was summoned before a
New York investigating grand jury to testify about the assault and
alleged conspiracies arising in connection with it. Refusing initially
on fifth amendment grounds to testify, petitioner was granted immunity. Shortly thereafter, a policeman testified to the grand jury
that Piccirillo had offered him money as an inducement to dispose
of the incriminating weapons. Subsequently indicted and convicted
of bribery, Piccirillo urged on appeal that even though he did not
actually discuss the attempted bribe in his own testimony, the fifth
amendment barred conviction for any transaction revealed by testimony compelled under a grant of immunity.
After having heard full argument on the case, five members of
the Court voted to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. Jus178. Section 414 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1970), immunizes from antitrust liability any conduct approved by a Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) order
issued pursuant to the provisions of § 408 of the Act.
179. 409 U.S. at 365 n.1.
180. 409 U.S. at 392, n.9 (dissenting opinion).
181. See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
182. Plaintiff's attorneys' fees amounted to $7.5 million and its costs were $336,605.12.
183. Piccirillo v. New York, 397 U.S. 933 (1970).
184. 400 U.S. 548 (1971) (per curiam).
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tices Brennan, Marshall, Douglas and Black, dissenting, expressed
their belief that dismissal was inappropriate." 5 Justice Brennan, in
a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Marshall, explained in detail
why the procedural posture of this immunity case was peculiarly
well suited for a determination of the scope of the fifth amendment
privilege.' Since Piccirillo had been prosecuted for an offense that
was related to his testimony, the issue before the Court was whether
the conviction, "given the substance of the compelled testimony,
falls within the constitutionally required immunity."'8 7 As Justices
Brennan and Marshall noted, such a case comes complete with a
detailed factual record that shows the substance of the compelled
testimony, the way in which the prosecutor used that information,
and the crime for which the defendant subsequently was convicted."" This background "provides important considerations to
anchor and inform the constitutional judgment."'8 9 At the other extreme, an immunity question can arise when a witness refuses to
testify on the ground that the immunity statute is not co-extensive
with the fifth amendment privilege. Because no testimony has in
fact been compelled, the Court in such circumstances is required to
analyze the particular statutory immunity provisions on a barren
record. In the absence of specific testimony by which to examine the
fifth amendment privilege, any decision in that situation necessarily
must emphasize nuances in abstract statutory interpretation. In
short, the record in Piccirilloprovided an excellent and rare opportunity to adjudicate the constitutional issues in the context of a
concrete factual setting.
As the dissenting Justices predicted, when the court subsequently accepted review on the scope of immunity issue, it dealt
with cases in which witnesses had refused to testify and were facing
contempt citations.1 0 Moreover, the deaths of Justices Harlan and
Black before the beginning of the 1971-72 term markedly changed
the composition of the Court. One never knows whether it is the
Court's different posture or a change in personnel that affects the
outcome of a particular case.' 9' Nonetheless it is clear that since
185. Id. at 549, 552.
186. Id. at 552-61.
187. Id. at 557.
188. Id. at 557-58.
189. Id. at 558.
190. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), rehearingdenied, 408 U.S. 931
(1972); Zicarelli v. New Jersey Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
191. Neither Justice Rehnquist nor Justice Brennan participated in Kastigar or
Zicarelli.
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dismissal of certiorari can have a significant effect on the timing and
posturing of issues, the ground rules on which such dismissal power
is exercised should be of considerable concern.
In the Senate hearings on the Judges' Bill, Justices McReynolds' 2 and Van Devanter" 3 described the practice of dismissing
writs as improvidently granted, and it is therefore certain that some
awareness of the practice existed at the time Congress elected to
expand discretionary Supreme Court jurisdiction. As Justice Van
Devanter explained to Congress, the Court had dismissed as improvidently granted writs in several cases during the October 1922
term: "[T]hat is to say, the court found after a full hearing that
the case really turned upon some matter which afforded no reasona' As Justice Van
ble or appropriate basis for granting the writ."194
Devanter went on to note, although the preliminary papers stated
that an important question of law was involved, counsel on argument "conceded that it turned entirely upon a question of fact and
that this was all that was involved. We then dismissed the petition
as . . . improvidently granted.119 5 Justice McReynolds observed
that "if those facts had been clearly pointed out to us to start with
the petition never would have been granted; this is what is meant
by saying that the petition was improvidently granted."'' 6
Locating cases in which the Supreme Court has dismissed writs
as improvidently granted is not an easy task because there is no
applicable research tool that isolates them. 97 Moreover, the recent
HarvardLaw Review studies of the Supreme Court's docket omit
reference to such cases.'98 Accordingly, one cannot be sure that his
research is complete. Nevertheless, with that caveat in mind, one
can conclude that until the 1950's the Court's use of writ dismissal
was decidedly uncontroversial." While the Court did dismiss cases
after briefing and argument, a dissent was a rare occurrence."' 0 The
192.
193.

See 1924 Senate Hearings 31.
See id. Justice Van Devanter also noted that "[giranting writs means, and only

means, that the court finds probable cause for a full consideration of the case in ordinary
course." Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
194. Id. at 31.
195. Id.
196. Id.

197. A collection of pre-1954 cases involving writ dismissals as improvidently granted
may be found in Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 349 U.S. 70, 78 n.2 (1955),
See also R. STERN & E. GRESSmAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 227-30 (4th ed. 1969).

198. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REv. 3, 344-53 (1971).
199. Compare Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 349 U.S. 70 (1955),
with cases cited at 349 U.S. 78 n.2.
200. See Harper & Rosenthal, supra note 8,at 296.
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situations described by Justices Van Devanter and McReynolds
seemed to characterize accurately early dismissals as improvidently
granted.2"' In these kinds of cases, further review of the entire record
revealed that different issues were involved than the Justices originally had suspected. 212 In some situations, too, the Justices have
indicated that they had been misled at the screening stage.0 3
If writ dismissals were confined to the circumstances outlined
by Justices Van Devanter and McReynolds, there would be no need
for further discussion or analysis. Despite the time already expended, dismissal where the screening process goes awry seems justifiable" 4 for two reasons: first, there is still a considerable time
saving if the Court can dispose of cases per curiam without a full
opinion on the merits; secondly, and more importantly, by granting
review the Court identifies for the bar its docket interests. Deciding
an improperly screened case might produce additional static in this
already imprecise system of communication. Although the Court
could indicate in an opinion on the merits that the case was improperly screened, such an opinion likely would not be accorded
great weight by members of the bar. Moreover, such disposition
might create an incentive for misrepresentation by parties at the
screening stage on the assumption that even if it became apparent
on further consideration by the Justices in conference that the issues
were not as they had been represented to the screener, a properly
packaged case could get past the initial screening and thereby receive full Supreme Court review. Accordingly, dismissals as improvidently granted are not controversial in such circumstances, provided that the Court adequately explains the basis on which it erred
in the screening process.
While writ dismissal is uncontroversial where the facts are mis201. Certiorari writs issued to settle a supposed conflict between circuits have been
dismissed as improvidently granted when further examination revealed the absence of such
a conflict. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Borras, 283 U.S. 798 (1931); Wisconsin Elec. Co. v. Dumore
Co., 282 U.S. 813 (1931); Keller v. Adams Campbell Co., 264 U.S. 314 (1924); Layne & Bowler
Corp. v. Western Well Works, Inc., 261 U.S. 387 (1923). See also The Sao Vicente, 260 U.S.
151 (1922).
202. E.g., Phillips v. New York, 362 U.S. 456 (1960); The Sao Vicente, 260 U.S. 151
(1922).
203. See, e.g., Bostic v. United States, 402 U.S. 547 (1971) (writ of certiorari issued to
review affirmance of petitioner's conspiracy conviction dismissed as improvidently granted
when shown, contrary to Government's representation, that petitioner neither was charged
nor convicted of the offense); The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359 U.S. 180 (1959).
204. See, e.g., Iowa Beef Packers, Inc. v. Thompson, 405 U.S. 228 (1972), dismissing
cert. as improvidently granted, 404 U.S. 820 (1971); McClanahan v. Morauer & Hartzell, Inc.,
404 U.S. 16 (1971), dismissing cert. as improvidently granted, 402 U.S. 1008 (1971).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

perceived or misrepresented at the screening stage, it is not understood so easily in other situations. One must recall that the proffered
rationale for discretionary jurisdiction was judicial overwork as reflected by a backlog of cases."'5 One must also recall our conclusion
that the rule of four should mean minority control of the screening
process, with the attendant power to impose a duty of principled
adjudication on the majority.0 6 Other things being equal, a vote to
grant review by four Justices, or three when only seven Justices
participate, should be considered a decision of the Court and accorded some degree of respect by the institution in its processes. As
a decision, the grant of review should as a minimum impose on the
Court an obligation to explain the basis on which it ultimately
decides to dismiss a case. Commentators often have noted that the
acceptability of Supreme Court action frequently hinges upon the
explanation the Court offers for its decisions and that the failure to
give reasons for certiorari dismissals increases the notion of Supreme Court arbitrariness, 7 especially when there are dissenting
opinions." 8 As Professor Sacks has written in the context of the per
curiam practice of the Court, "It might be well for the Court, as a
matter of general though not invariable practice, to give an explanation of its views whenever a dissenting opinion is written ....
Individual Justices' Views on Dismissals
It may be helpful at this point to set forth the views taken by
certain members of the Court on the subject of writ dismissal. Justice Frankfurter, for example, asserted in the by now familiar FELA
cases that he did not feel bound by the decision of four Justices to
grant review and exercised what he called the "historic" right of a
Justice to dissent according to his conscience from an action of the
Court. 210 Accordingly, he refused to participate in these cases, which
he felt were improper subjects of Supreme Court review.211 Although
Justice Harlan (joined by Justice Stewart) 212 did not approve the
205. See notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text.
206. See notes 167-68 supra and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 67, at 90.
208. See, e.g., Linehan v. Waterfront Comm'n, 347 U.S. 439 (1954); Alaska Steamship
Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954).
209. Sacks, supra note 9, at 103.
210. Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 528 (1957) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting). Cf. McBride v. Toledo Terminal R.R., 354 U.S. 517, 517-20 (1957) (dissent).
211. See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
212. See Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S. 107, 111 (1959) (Stewart,
J., concurring).
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grant of certiorari in the FELA cases, he felt that dismissal of certiorari would impair the integrity of the rule of four unless considerations appeared upon plenary review "which were not manifest or
fully apprehended at the time certiorari was granted. 2 13 Arguing
that Justice Frankfurter's right of dissent was exhausted once certiorari was granted, Justice Harlan felt that any other view would
undermine the rationale of the rule of four that
a minority could
2
compel a principled adjudication by the Court. 1
In United States v. Shannon21 5 Justice Douglas announced his
disagreement with Justice Frankfurter's approach to dismissal of
certiorari. Justice Douglas thought that a
*

.

. Justice who has voted to deny the writ of certiorari is in no position after

argument to vote to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. Only those who
have voted to grant the writ have that privilege ....

If four can grant and the

opposing five dismiss, then the four cannot get a decision of the case on the
merits. The integrity of the four-vote rule on certiorari would then be impaired."'

Although they both disagreed with the Frankfurter stance, the
positions of Harlan and Douglas were hardly identical. The difference was highlighted in 1971 when Justice Harlan concurred in a
dismissal as improvidently granted 21 7 on the ground that "[s]ince
certiorari was granted, a number of events have occurred that, in
my judgment, have rendered this case wholly inappropriate for our
review." 2 ' In a dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas objected to the
dismissal because the four dissenters were the only Justices who
originally had voted to set the case for argument. 219 Noting that the
rule of four "allows any four Justices to

. .

. set the case for consid-

eration on the merits, ' 221 Justice Douglas asserted that it is improper for the majority "to dismiss the case after oral argument
unless one of the four who voted to grant moves so to do, which has
not occurred here. ' 21 According to Douglas, that material information arose subsequently or that the posture of the case changed is
not sufficient to warrant dismissal. Rather, the duty of the five
213. Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 559 (1957) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
214. Id. at 559-61; accord, Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S. 107,
111 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring).
215. 342 U.S. 288 (1952).
216. Id. at 298.
217. Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie, 402 U.S. 497 (1971) (per curiam).
218. Id. at 498.
219. Id. at 508.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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opposing Justices is to persuade the others at conference, "but,
failing that, to vote on the merits of the case. '2 2
In Iowa Beef Packers, Inc. v. Thompson,23 Justice Douglas
modified his previous view somewhat. The lone dissenter in that
case, he argued that the Court "should 'dismiss as improvidently
granted' only in exceptional situations and where all nine members
of the Court agree. In all other cases the merits of the controversy
'22 4
should be decided.
Grounds for Dismissal
There are three ways in which dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted can occur. First, one or more of the Justices who
originally voted to grant review can change his mind. Second, one
or more of the Justices who originally voted to grant review could
leave the Court and be replaced by a new Justice who does not share
his predecessor's view of the certworthiness of a particular case. 25
Third, there might be no alteration in the position of any Justice,
but the majority could still vote to dismiss certiorari by a five-four
22
vote.
Dismissal is appropriate where one or more Justices alters his
view about the certworthiness of a particular case, provided that the
reason for the change of mind is expressed by opinion. This conclusion finds support in the position taken by Justices Harlan and
White that a Justice who votes to grant review should vote on the
merits unless an intervening factor "so diminishes a case's public
significance, when viewed in light of the difficulty of the questions

presented, as to justify

. . .

dismissing the writ.

' 22 1

Moreover, it is

consistent with the early Douglas position that writ dismissal can
occur when one of the four who vote to hear the case changes his
mind. It does not conform, however, to Justice Douglas's latest opin222. Id. See also United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93, 115-16 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
223. 405 U.S. 228 (1972) (per curiam).
224. Id. at 232.
225. E.g., Duncan v. Tennessee, 405 U.S. 127 (1927).
226. See Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie, 402 U.S. 497 (1971); Piccirillo v.
New York, 400 U.S. 548 (1971); Miller v. California, 392 U.S. 616 (1968); Hanner v. DeMarcus, 390 U.S. 736 (1968); NAACP v. Overstreet, 384 U.S. 118 (1966); Smith v. Butler, 366
U.S. 161 (1961); The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359 U.S. 180 (1959); Ellis v.
Dixon, 349 U.S. 458 (1955); Hammerstein v. Superior Court, 341 U.S. 491 (1951); cf. Jacobs
v. New York, 388 U.S. 431 (1967). See also Holt v. Alleghany Corp., 384 U.S. 28 (1966);
Rudolph v. United States, 370 U.S. 269 (1962).
227. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 477 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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ion as expressed in Iowa Beef Packers that all must agree on a writ
dismissal."' Requiring unanimity for writ dismissal might very well
have the opposite effect from the one presumably intended by Justice Douglas. Because a single Justice could compel the Court to
render a decision on the merits, such restrictiveness could operate
to discourage fence-sitting Justices from voting to grant review in
borderline cases.
Except where the change of mind occurs because of misrepresentation by the parties in the preliminary papers,229 the members
of the Court should treat the grant of review as an institutional
decision of the Court and should bear a burden of justifying and
explaining any deviation from that original position. While the
grant of review may reflect more a Justice's "feel"23 than any articulable principle, a dismissal after full argument should elicit a principled response from a Justice who no longer deems the case appropriate for review. Because the majesty of the Court's process of
principled decision-making is invoked with the decision to grant
plenary review, unprincipled (that is, "prudent" in Bickel's parlance)2311 considerations should be suppressed in the process of deciding whether to dismiss certiorari. Since plenary review has already
been voted in these cases, they are also distinguishable from the per
curiams that Professor Deutsch has suggested might be viewed as
political devices of building institutional credibility.2 2 While this is
not to say that principles of prudence should not be developed to
guide the dismissal process, 33 Justices who consider reversing their
positions on certworthiness should be constrained by an evolving
common law of certiorari dismissals. This deference to precedent
would tie the decision-making process to principled adjudication
even though the principles evolved were ones of "prudence, 2 34 and
228. See note 224 supra and accompanying text. It is doubtful whether Justice Douglas
himself followed this rule in earlier cases. See, e.g., NLRB v. J. H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396
U.S. 258, 266 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting); The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc.,
359 U.S. 180 (1959).
229. See note 203 supra and accompanying text.
230. See Harlan, supra note 36, at 549.
231. See note 116 supra and accompanying text.
232. See notes 122-26 supra and accompanying text.
233. Cf. Sanks v. Georgia, 401 U.S. 144 (1971) (appeal dismissed on ground that subsequent developments had rendered it inappropriate for resolution of issues originally raised);
Parker v. County of Los Angeles, 338 U.S. 327 (1949) (certiorari writs dismissed on ground
that pending state litigation rendered issues raised unripe for adjudication).
234. It is also important to remember that many devices for nondecision, such as abstention, have an intellectual content of their own. See generally Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S.
288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Wright, TheAbstention DoctrineReconsidered,
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it would impose an institutional limitation on the otherwise unfettered discretion of the Justices to vote for or against certiorari ab
initio.2315

If the decision to grant review is to receive deference as an
institutional position of the Court, then it follows that an alteration
in the composition of the Court should not be an acceptable basis
on which to dismiss certiorari. When a newly appointed Justice's
assessment of the certworthiness of a case differs from that of his
predecessor, the institution, which has committed itself to a decision on docketing priorities, should abide by its screening decision
unless one of the four Justices who voted for review changes his
mind or some other intervening circumstance alters the propriety of
hearing the case. Thus a disagreement by the new Justice with the
substantive policy decision to review a particular case or issue
should not be an acceptable basis for dismissal."'
The most difficult writ dismissal cases to understand or justify
are those like Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie,'3 1 wherein

five Justices disregarded the obligation of principled adjudication
imposed on them by the rule of four. Moreover, in some of these fivefour decisions the majority does not even write a per curiam opinion
to explain its action.28 In at least one other, the five member majority informed the four dissenting Justices upon further examination
of the record that the basis on which the dissenters had voted to
grant review did not exist, even though the dissenters believed that
an issue on which they sought review was in fact raised by the
record. 219 If the rule of four is to effect minority control of the screening process, as all but Justice Frankfurter seem to have conceded,
then dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted is inappropriate and indefensible where four Justices dissent. The view taken
by Justice Harlan in Ritchie is particularly puzzling.24 If, as he
37 TEXAs L. REv. 815 (1959); Note, Abstention: An Exercise in Federalism, 108 U. PA. L. REv.
226 (1959).
235. This seems to have played some role in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409 (1968).
236. Cf. Gressman, supra note 35, at 760 (noting that despite changes in Court personnel, "a high degree of continuity in basic decisional direction seems to be maintained").
237. 402 U.S. 497 (1971) (per curiam).
238. E.g., Hanner v. DeMarcus, 390 U.S. 736 (1968); NAACP v. Overstreet, 384 U.S.
118 (1966).
239. Smith v. Butler, 366 U.S. 161 (1961).
240. In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan stated that "[s]ince certiorari was
granted, a number of events have occurred that, in my judgment, have rendered this case
wholly inappropriate for our review." 402 U.S. at 498.

19731

SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION

seems to have conceded in the FELA cases, ' 4 ' the rule of four dic-

tates that the minority can compel the majority to dispose of a case
on a principled basis, then it is difficult to see the relevance of the
change in a case's posture for purposes of writ dismissal, provided
that four Justices do not find that this different situation has persuaded them to change their mind about the desirability of Supreme Court review. Nor is it clear what bearing Justice Harlan's
exposition of the new legislative situation should have in light of his
inability to persuade any of the four dissenters of the importance of
this altered state of affairs. Had Justice Harlan been one of the four
who voted to grant review, then his concurrence would make eminent good sense as an explanation of what persuaded him to change
his mind about the certworthiness of the case; but as a member of
the majority, Justice Harlan's analysis of the certworthiness of the
case should have no bearing. 2 2 Justice Douglas makes this point in
2
dissent. '

Criteriafor Dismissal
If a Justice who changes his mind about the certworthiness of
a case must articulate his reasons therefor, some discussion of criteria is called for. The following discussion does not pretend to be
comprehensive but only raises tentatively some relevant factors.
First, Justice Harlan's position that an intervening event could legitimately alter a Justice's view of the propriety of review 244 appears
sound, provided that the Justice identifies the intervening factor
and explains how it influenced his screening decision. Secondly,
different Justices may vote initially to grant review of a case for
different reasons.2

5

1

If upon further analysis a Justice discovers that

the questions for which he voted to grant review are not raised by
the case, then he should feel free to vote for dismissal, on the condition that he articulate the question he finds worthy of plenary consideration.
This evidently occurred in Tacon v. Arizona,246 where the Court
241. See notes 149-50 supra and accompanying text.
242. It follows, therefore, that a 5-4 dismissal would be improper where no majority
opinion is written. See cases cited note 238 supra. Dismissals without opinion should be
eschewed, particularly in the case of 5-4 dismissals where the question of the minority's power
to compel a principled decision is threatened.
243. 402 U.S. at 508.
244. See note 240 supra and accompanying text.
245. See Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 917 (1950) (opinion of
Frankfurter, J.).
246. 410 U.S. 351 (1973) (per curiam).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

dismissed the writ on the ground that the record did not raise the
broad issues that at least one Justice must have found worthy of
review. The petitioner in Tacon, who was arrested in Arizona and
charged with the unlawful sale of marihuana while on active military duty, was discharged prior to trial and voluntarily went to New
York. Lacking sufficient funds to finance the return trip to Arizona,
he was unable to appear on the date set for his trial. In dismissing
the writ, the Court admitted that the petition raised a question
concerning the constitutional limitations on state authority to try
in absentia a person who voluntarily has left the state and who for
financial reasons cannot return on time. That broad issue had not
been raised below, however, and the Court therefore felt unable to
address it.47

Justice Douglas, with whom Justices Brennan and Marshall
concurred in dissent, urged that the case raised important sixth
amendment right of confrontation issues and the question whether
Tacon in fact voluntarily had waived that right. 48 Although it acknowledged that a waiver issue was involved, the majority was
nonetheless unwilling to review the case on the ground that waiver
"is primarily a factual issue which does not, by itself, justify the
exercise of our certiorari jurisdiction .

"..."249
The

dissenters re-

sponded that although waiver always raises factual questions,
waiver problems
are far from frivolous and should not be treated
"cavalierly."2' 50 In short, while the dissenters felt that the issue of
sixth amendment waiver vel non was ready for decision, four Justices did not share that view of the screening priority of the waiver
issue on its own. To some extent this contrariety of opinion might
reflect differing attitudes among the Justices concerning the Court's
appropriate role in deciding whether specific actions amount to a
waiver of constitutional rights. As long as discretionary review and
the rule of four prevail, however, it would seem that a Justice who
on broad constitutional grounds votes in favor of review should be
able to vote for dismissal if the record in fact does not raise that
issue.25 '
As a general rule, however, a Justice who has voted to review a
247. Id. at 352.
248. Id. at 353.
249. Id. at 352.
250. Id. at 354.
251. Cf. Skinner v. Louisiana, 393 U.S. 473 (1969), dismissing cert. as improvidently
granted, 391 U.S. 963 (1968); Wainwright v. New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598 (1968), dismissing
cert. as improvidently granted, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967).
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case should vote on the merits. At least three circumstances appear
to have arisen in the cases and deserve discussion: cases in which
one or more Justices conclude after argument that while the legal
issue is the one he had originally identified, the significance of that
issue is less critical than he had believed; 52 cases in which one or
more Justices conclude after argument that the specific facts do not
provide an optimal vehicle for addressing the underlying issues of
importance;2 3 and cases in which one or more Justices conclude that
2 54
political expediency dictates avoiding a decision on the merits.
Since the original justification for discretionary review was
docket overcrowding, and since the initial screening decision deserves respect as an institutional decision of the Court, a Justice's
reevaluation of the subjective importance of an issue should not,
absent other factors, warrant a vote of dismissal. Since the "feel"
that is so necessary at the initial screening stage seems to underlie
such a change, and since a Justice incurs a duty to explain on
principled grounds a change in his vote, it would be very difficult
to develop a principled common law based on such inherently
subjective considerations as diminished importance. In light of the
justification for discretionary jurisdiction, although little is
sacrificed by an adjudication of this type of case on the merits, the
integrity of the Court's process might suffer from attempts at explaining the inexplicable.
The situation encountered by a Justice who concludes that a
case is not a good vehicle for resolving an issue presents a closer
question.25 Absent a strong and articulable reason not to decide a
case, however, a Justice should consider himself bound by the initial
screening determination. The "vehicle" concept certainly is germane to the Court's responsibility of establishing national priorities
in constitutional and legal matters,'2 but since the propriety of a
case's serving as a vehicle is such a difficult concept to explain in a
252. See, e.g., Monks v. New Jersey, 398 U.S. 71 (1970), dismissing cert. as improvidently granted, 395 U.S. 903 (1968).
253. See, e.g., Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 397 U.S. 31 (1970) (per curiam), dismissing
cert. as improvidently granted, 396 U.S. 817 (1969); Wainwright v. New Orleans, 392 U.S.
598, dismissing cert. as improvidently granted,385 U.S. 1001 (1967); Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560 (1968), dismissing cert. as improvidently granted, 386 U.S. 931 (1967).
254. See, e.g., Johnson v. Massachusetts, 390 U.S. 511 (1968), dismissing cert. as improvidently granted, 389 U.S. 816 (1967); Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.,
349 U.S. 70 (1955), dismissing cert. as improvidently grantd, 347 U.S. 942 (1954).
255. See, e.g., Wainwright v. New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598, 599 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring).
256. See Lewin, supra note 42, at 17-18.
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principled way, the construct should be invoked sparingly. Moreover, since the "vehicle" concept has no foundation in the overcrowding rationale for certiorari jurisdiction, such an administrative
justification is not relevant.
Of course, it is not always easy to find a suitable case" ' in which
to decide an issue 25 that four members of the Court agree should be
addressed on the merits. For example, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in two cases 259 to determine whether North Carolina v.
Pearce,210 which proscribes the punitive imposition of stiffer sentences by a judge on retrial, should be applied retroactively. In
both cases, however, the standards set forth in Pearcewere met and
the issue of retroactivity therefore did not arise. Because they were
inappropriate vehicles for deciding the retroactivity issue,2 ' the
Court properly dismissed certiorari in those cases.
A case like Jones v. State Board of Education22 is more difficult. Petitioner, a student at Tennessee State University, was suspended indefinitely for distributing leaflets urging blacks to boycott
the fall registration. By a six-three vote, the Court dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted because the record revealed that the
suspension may have been based in part on a finding that petitioner
at the hearing on the charges against him had lied. 263 The record,
however, did not preclude a disposition of the first amendment
claims in conjunction with a remand to determine the extent to
which the alleged dishonesty had influenced the outcome of the
suspension hearing.6 4 Since the issue on which certiorari was
257. Compare Sanks v. Georgia, 401 U.S. 144 (1971) and Simmons v. West Haven
Housing Authority, 399 U.S. 510 (1970), with Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
258. See Lewin, supra note 42, at 17-18. See also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784,
801 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (the Court has been "at pains to 'reach out' to decide"
the question of the incorporation of the double jeopardy clause).
259. See Odom v. United States, 400 U.S. 23 (1970); Moon v. Maryland, 398 U.S. 319
(1970); cf. Michigan v. Payne, 93 S. Ct. 1966 (1973); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 411 U.S. 903
(1973).
260. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
261. Since the Pearcestandards were effectively applied in Odom and Moon, the Court
could not appropriately determine whether the standards themselves should apply retroactively.
262. 397 U.S. 31 (1970) (per curiam).
263. "This fact sufficiently clouds the record to render the case an inappropriate vehicle
for this Court's first decision on the extent of First Amendment restrictions upon the power
of state universities to expel or indefinitely suspend students for the expression of views
alleged to be disruptive of the good order of the campus." Id. at 32; cf. Papish v. Board of
Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973); Healy v. James, 404 U.S. 983 (1971).
264. The alleged dishonesty apparently was revealed at oral argument. Interview with
Robert H. Roberts. Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee, in Washington, D.C., Nov. 16,
1971. Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan addressed the merits.
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granted certainly was raised at least in part by the facts, 5 a resolution of the issue on the merits would have represented a more principled response by the Court. The dismissal in Jones might be attributable, however, to another consideration-that Jones was an inappropriate vehicle because Jones himself may have lied and therefore
the Court's decision could not definitively resolve the controversy.
Far from striking a blow for first amendment guarantees, such a
decision might afford the university an opportunity to undercut the
Supreme Court's enunciation of first amendment doctrine by a later
ruling that Jones was suspended for lack of candor. This basis for
dismissal therefore falls more appropriately into the category of
political expediency. Although considerations of institutional prudence can serve as legitimate bases for a principled decision to
dismiss certiorari, the Court did not articulate clearly those concerns in Jones. While there was an intimation of political sensitivity, there was no explicit explanation.2 66
No discussion of political expediency as a rationale for writ
dismissal would be complete without some mention of Rice v. Sioux
City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.,"87 perhaps the most well known
case in which certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted.
Petitioner, the wife of a serviceman killed during the Korean War,
purchased a cemetery lot for her husband. When cemetery officials
learned that Rice was an Indian, they refused burial on the ground
that the lot contract limited burial privileges to Caucasians. Mrs.
Rice sued for damages, but the Iowa courts rejected her claim, based
on the language in the contract. The Supreme Court granted certiorari 5 8 and divided four-four on the merits,2 9 thereby upholding the
decision of the lower court. On rehearing, however, the Court vacated its previous order and by a five-three vote dismissed the writ
as improvidently granted."'
The constitutional issue raised in Rice was extremely sensitive
in light of the recently decided Segregation Cases.2 7 Whether state
265. 397 U.S. at 32 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
266. Cf. Parker v. County of Los Angeles, 338 U.S. 327 (1949); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
267. 349 U.S. 70 (1955). For a more complete recital of the facts of this controversy see
Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110 (1953).
268. 347 U.S. 942 (1954).
269. 348 U.S. 880 (1954). An affirmance by an equally divided court "deprive[s] the
decision of all prececential value ...
" Inman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 361 U.S. 138, 146
(1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
270. 349 U.S. 70 (1955).
271. See note 10, supra. See also Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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action was involved so as to warrant a finding that equal protection
had been violated presented a ticklish constitutional matter that
had long divided the Court."' On rehearing the Justices saw "in
proper focus" for the first time a statute which Iowa had passed
during the course of the Rice litigation and which the Iowa court had
used "in tangential support" of its decision. " Although it barred
the kind of burial discrimination involved in Rice, the new law
specifically did not "affect the rights of any parties to any pending
litigation. 7' 24 While the particular controversy before the Court was
still very much alive, the majority concluded that the statute made
the facts so unusual that the case would be of "isolated significance."2 5 In view of its diminished importance and the risk of an
"inconclusive and divisive disposition, 2 the Court dismissed the
case.
The changed disposition on rehearing did not affect the rights
of the parties, and "neither disposition has any weight as a precedent on the merits,"' 7 but the proffered explanation of the Court
conforms to the norms espoused herein for principled adjudication.2 1 The case for dismissal, however, did not really rest on the
diminished importance argument. Justice Frankfurter's opinion is
a clear judicial expression of the considerations of prudence that
27 9
Professor Bickel subsequently labeled the "passive virtues.1
Frankfurter relied on two considerations of prudence: first, he reasoned that if the action of the state were unconstitutional, the Court
"should hesitate to pass judgment on Iowa for unconstitutional ac272. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 470 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 13 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Raymond v. Chicago
Union Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20 (1907).
273. 349 U.S. at 75.
274. Id. at 76.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 77.
277. Braucher, Foreword to the Supreme Court, 1954 Term, 69 HARV. L. REV. 120, 125
(1955); see Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) (affirmance by an equally divided court is
not entitled to precedential weight).
278. The argument advanced that the case is of reduced national significance because
of the Iowa statute is, however, unsupportable. The cemetery apparently conceded that
approximately 90 percent of the private cemeteries in the United States used the same racial
restriction. Accordingly, "legislation in Iowa hardly makes the problem moot in the rest of
the country." Braucher, supra note 277, at 125.
Furthermore, the fact that a case involves only the interests of the individual litigants
should not be the basis for a writ dismissal, although it would be a proper basis for an original
vote to deny review.
279. See notes 103 & 106 supra and accompanying text. It is interesting to note that
Professor Bickel clerked for Mr. Justice Frankfurter during the 1952 Term.
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tion . . .when it has already rectified any possible error;" ' secondly, he theorized that even if the state's actions were constitutional, they would not necessarily be proper, and the Court "should
not unnecessarily discourage such remedial action by possible condonation of this isolated incident."28' 1 Cognizant of the legitimation
that attaches to Supreme Court decisions, Justice Frankfurter expressly articulated the Court's collective judgment that even if the
Court cannot properly eradicate a particular instance of discrimination through principled decision-making, racial discrimination
should not be encouraged by the Court as an institution. Professor
Braucher properly perceived the intensely political nature of Frankfurter's rationale, claiming that discouraging legislation by condonation was an inappropriate function for a court.28 2 Nevertheless, it
seems abundantly clear from the current flap about the Freund
Committee proposals that the discretionary authority of the Supreme Court to hear whatever cases it wishes invests it with a political power that must be recognized. When dismissing certiorari for
reasons of prudence, however, the Court must express those reasons
in a principled fashion. The Rice Court seemed to be making a
valiant effort at doing just that.283
Conclusion
With judicial reform a matter of intense public debate, it is
essential that one understand the political consequences that may
result from the adoption of various reform measures. Moreover, it
is important to recognize that an evaluation of any proposed change
must proceed from one's conception of the role of the Supreme
Court in our society and one's perception of the foundations of its
legitimacy. Similar considerations also must shape one's analysis of
the rule of four and the Court's practice of dismissing certiorari as
improvidently granted.
While discretionary review increasingly has politicized a large
portion of the Court's work, a political decision to grant review
280. 349 U.S. at 77.
281. Id.

282. "[S]uch lobbying strategy sounds more like legislative discretion than 'sound
judicial discretion.'" Braucher, supra note 277, at 126.
283. There is some question how the Court can formulate principles such as in
Rice-namely, that the Court opposes racial discrimination. Presumably, the considerations
of prudence are easily applied in clear situations like Rice; but the Court is evidently not
willing to stay its hand in all cases in which discrimination exists and in which its actions
would have the effect of condonation. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163
(1972); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
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should be treated with the respect due an institutional determination of the Court. Before proceeding to reverse itself by dismissing
certiorari, the Court should articulate reasons for its ultimate refusal to hear a case. In this way, a common law of precedent will
evolve that would limit this form of dismissal; since other techniques for avoiding adjudication on the merits, such as the abstention doctrine, have an intellectual content of their own, so should
writ dismissals. In deference to the principle of minority control of
the screening process, however, certiorari should not be dismissed
as improvidently granted if four of nine or three of seven Justices
dissent.

